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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Copyright-The Obscenity Defense in Actions To Protect Copyright.-In
1972, Jartech, Inc., produced a movie entitled "Behind the Green Door" and
showed the film to selected audiences to determine public acceptance. After
some changes in the sound track, the movie was registered with the United
States Copyright Office as a film "other than photoplay,"' and was released
on April 18, 1973. Jartech entered into an agreement with Mitchell Brothers
Film Group on February 1, 1973, granting Mitchell Brothers the exclusive
right to distribute and exhibit "Behind the Green Door." Mitchell Brothers
then licensed the film for exhibition in theaters across the country.
Kenneth Bora, operator of the Cinema Adult Theater in Dallas, acquired
several pirated copies of the film and showed them in his theater, despite the fact
that Mitchell Brothers advised him that his copies were made in violation of
copyright. Plaintiffs then brought suit in federal district court against Bora and
the theater, alleging copyright infringement and seeking both injunctive relief
and damages.
At trial, defendants contended that the copyright on "Behind the Green Door"
was invalid on several grounds. They argued that the film had been fraudulently
described in the application for copyright as "other than photoplay"; that it had
been exhibited without restriction before a proper copyright was obtained and
that it was therefore in the public domain; that it did not contain a proper
copyright mark; and, finally, that it was obscene and therefore not a proper
subject for copyright.
The court rejected the first,2 second, 3 and third4 of defendants' contentions.
Regarding the fourth point, however, the court stated that obscenity was a valid
defense in a copyright action. After viewing the film, the court found that it was
obscene5 and therefore not entitled to copyright protection, and judgment was
1. Copyright Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 5(m), 61 Stat. 652 (current version at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (1977)). A film other than photoplay was described by the court as a film
which "has no plot, such as a newsreel, travelog, promotional film, and nature study film."
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
2. The court said that "Behind the Green Door" could be described as having no plot and was
therefore classified correctly. Further, there was no evidence of fraudulent intent, so that if the
classification were incorrect, such mistake would not be grounds for invalidating the copyright.
192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 141; see Copyright Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, § 5, 61 Stat. 652
(current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (1977)).
3. Since the film was shown to a selected audience for the limited purpose of gauging public
response, the court found that there was no dedication to the general public and that the film was
therefore not in the public domain. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 141 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
4. The copy of the film viewed by the court was found to bear a proper copyright mark. Id.
5. Id. at 144. There was some question as to whether the film should have been judged under
the standard of Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), as modified by Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which was in effect at the time the movie was produced and
copyrighted, or under the standard of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), decided shortly
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entered for defendants. 6 Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
The defense of obscenity in a copyright infringement action arises from an old
common law rule that material which is illegal or immoral cannot be the subject
of a valid copyright. 7 In Mitchell Brothers, the defense was raised for the first
time since the Supreme Court established the local community standard for
determining obscenity in Miller v. California. 8 Since the law concerning copy-
right is national in scope, while the Miller community standard is local, several
obvious inconsistencies result. When a film is judged obscene according to the
contemporary community standards of one jurisdiction, and the copyright on
that film is invalidated, a question arises as to the effect of that declaration of
invalidity on the status of the copyright in a jurisdiction where the film has not
yet been judged obscene by its own community standard. Is the copyright invalid
everywhere, only in the jurisdiction where it was found to be obscene, or only for
the purposes of the suit in which it was declared invalid? If the copyright is
invalid everywhere, it would seem that Mitchell Brothers Film Group would be
exposed to piracy of "Behind the Green Door" in New York because the film was
found to be obscene according to the community standards of Texas, even
though no court in New York had yet passed upon the film. No decision has
examined the effect of a declaration of the invalidity of a copyright. However, if
the situation is analogous to cases involving patents, which are usually consid-
ered void everywhere when declared void by one court, 9 a film declared obscene
in one locale could be legally pirated anywhere.
There is no statutory basis for a defense of obscenity in a copyright infringe-
ment suit. Neither the old copyright law' ° nor the new one' 1 mentions that
obscene materials cannot be the subject of a valid copyright. Rather, the doctrine
is one of common law origin that has survived almost without change from its
beginnings in nineteenth century England.
The first appearance of the rule was dictum of Chief Justice Eyre in an early
English decision, Dr. Priestley's Case. 12 Dr. Priestley had brought an action for
after the copyright had been registered. The court found that "Behind the Green Door" was
obscene under both formulations. Mitchell Bros. Film Gioup v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1976). For a discussion of these standards for determining
obscenity, see notes 54-61 infra and accompanying text.
6. The court reviewed several older cases supporting the rule that obscene material is not a
proper subject for copyright. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 142-43 (N.D. Tex. 1976). For a discussion of the development and
acceptance of this rule, see notes 12-34 infra and accompanying text.
7. M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 36, at 146.29 (1976).
8. 413 U.S. 15, 31-34 (1973).
9. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 111. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
For a discussion of the effect of judgment of invalidity of patents, see notes 70-79 infra and
accompanying text.
10. Copyright Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (current version at 17 U.S.C.A. §§
101-810 (1977)).
11. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (1977).
12. Dr. Priestley's Case was not reported, but descriptions of it can be found in Southey v.
Sherwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (Ch. 1817), and Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65, 65
(K.B. 1826).
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damages against "the hundred"'13 for property, including unpublished manu-
scripts, that had been destroyed during a riot. Defendants claimed that Dr.
Priestley.was in the habit of publishing works injurious to the government, but
produced no evidence to support the statement. Chief Justice Eyre said that such
evidence would have been admissible if produced. While this statement was
erroneous, as such evidence would be inadmissible unless relevant to the specific
manuscripts destroyed, not to Dr. Priestley's work in general, ' 4 it nonetheless
formed the foundation of the doctrine.
Equity courts adopted this dictum and applied it in actions seeking to enjoin
copyright infringement as well as an accounting of profits. Is There was some
disagreement, however, as to the wisdom of denying relief on the basis of the
immorality of the publication. In Walcot v. Walker, 16 the Lord Chancellor
adopted the rule ofDr. Priestley's Case, interpreting it as meaning that an author
had no property right at law in illegal or immoral publications, and therefore no
right to equitable relief. 17 Fifteen years later, in Southey v. Sherwood, 18 the
Lord Chancellor not only repeated that an author lacks property rights in a work
that "is not an innocent publication,"' 9 but he also dealt with the argument that
the refusal to grant an injunction only multiplied the number of copies available.
While this argument was rejected, 0 it was indicative of the disagreement
regarding the wisdom of the doctrine. Two cases decided in 1822 reiterated the
rule and denied copyright protection to publications which violated the law by
expressing views contrary to Biblical teachings. 2 ' Several years later, a court of
13. Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65, 65 (K.B. 1826); Southey v. Sherwood, 35 Eng.
Rep. 1006, 1007 (Ch. 1817).
14. See C. McCormick, Evidence § 185, at 434 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Later courts
recognized the error in Chief Justice Eyre's reasoning, but the rule had already been accepted and
used. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65, 65 (KLB. 1826), where the court
acknowledged that "it is plain that the dictum of Eyre C.J. was not well founded in law," but
nonetheless went on to apply the doctrine.
15. See cases cited notes 16-21 infra.
16. 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1802).
17. Id. In Walcot, plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain defendants from publishing two
editions of plaintiff's works. The Lord Chancellor found the works to be "of such a nature, that
the author can maintain no action at law for the invasion of that, which he calls his property, but
which the policy of the law will not permit him to consider his property," and therefore declined
to grant equitable relief. Id. He suggested that plaintiff first establish a property right at law and
then apply to equity for an injunction and accounting. Id.
18. 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1817).
19. Id. at 1007.
20. Id. at 1008. Lord Chancellor Eldon reasoned that equity was concerned only with the
civil interests of the parties, not with the resulting proliferation of undesirable publications. Id.
Today, judicial concern over the practical results of refusal to enjoin obscene publications is still
with us. See Argos Films v. Barry Int'l Properties, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 1062, slip op. at 19
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1977); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
21. Lawrence v. Smith, 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch. 1822) (lectures on physiology and zoology
illegal because contrary to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul); Murray v. Benbow, cited
in Lawrence v. Smith, id. at 929 n. 1 (injunction against publication of pirated copies of Byron's
Cain refused because poem's story conflicted with Scriptures).
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law considered the problem for the first time and adopted the approach of
equity. 22
The rule that illegal or immoral works will not be protected by copyright,
which was introduced in incorrectly-reasoned dictum, enforced by equity, and
later accepted in law courts, was adopted in the United States as part of the
English common law tradition. It was virtually unused, however, until the late
1800's,23 at which time cases began to appear in which the defendant claimed
obscenity as a defense in a copyright action.
American courts accepted the rule without hesitation and were ingenious in
devising rationales for its continued use. Some courts based the doctrine on the
limitations implicit in the Constitution itself, 24 on the theory that obscenity does
not "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. ''2s Others based their
decisions on the idea that the courts are the guardians of the public virtue. 26 Still
others relied on the equitable doctrine of clean hands to refuse relief to an author
whose work was deemed morally offensive. 27 Some courts used a combination of
the above theories, 28 and others merely applied the rule without attempting to
explain its validity. 29
22. Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826). While equity was not precedent for
courts of law, the justices accepted equity's interpretation of Dr. Priestley's Case. The court did,
however, recognize the error in reasoning in that case. It also refined the principle that an author
has no property right in an obscene work by stating that .while he has no right as regards
copyright, he does have a property right for other purposes, such as larceny. Id. at 65.
23. Obscenity was largely ignored by the courts in this country until the latter half of the 19th
century. See F. Lewis, Literature, Obscenity, & Law 6 (1976). It first became an issue in
Massachusetts and New York, and in the federal courts in those jurisdictions. Alpert, Judicial
Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 53-64 (1938).
24. See, e.g., Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Barnes v. Miner, 122 F.
480, 489-90 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)
(No. 9,173).
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The laws regarding copyright are enacted under the power
conferred by this section. The courts reasoned that since obscenity was not within this constitu-
tional definition, Congress had no power to bring obscene matter under the protection of the
copyright laws and could not have intended that obscenity be so protected. See cases cited note 24
su pr .
26. See, e.g., Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173);
Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875).
27. See, e.g., Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1947). For a case voiding a
copyright because of fraudulent misrepresentation, in which the doctrine of clean hands was
invoked, see Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co , 220 F. 837, 841-43 (5th Cir. 1913).
The defense of fraudulent misrepresentation in a copyright action derives from the same rule as
the obscenity defense.
In cases where it was doubtful that the material in question was immoral, several courts have
used the opposite of the clean hands approach, stating that when the validity of the defense is
unclear, the case should be resolved in favor of the holder of the copyright. See Khan v. Leo
Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450, 458 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947); Simonton v.
Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
28. See, e.g., Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16
F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
29. See, e.g., Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 78 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898) (rule
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Until Mitchell Brothers, the defense of obscenity in a copyright suit had
been virtually unused since the 1940's. It had been reaffirmed, however, by the
Attorney General in an opinion issued in 1958.30 The opinion stated that obscen-
ity was still a valid defense in a copyright action, 3' and that the usual method for
denying copyright protection was invalidation of the copyright by the courts. 32
The court in Mitchell Brothers revivedjudicial use of the rule, 33 which has more
recently been followed in another copyright suit, Argos Filmns v. Barry Interna-
tional Properties, Inc. 3 4
The rule of Dr. Priestley's Case has survived unchanged for almost two
centuries. The standards for deciding what is illegal or immoral, however, have
changed considerably. Just as illegality depends on the state of the law at any
given time, the concept of immorality depends upon "the blushing-point of a
particular society at a particular point in time ... ,,1s If the legal and ethical
standards of the nineteenth century had been an essential part of the doctrine of
Dr. Priestley's Case, the doctrine would have died shortly after it was born.
Instead, the rule has survived and only the obscenity tests used in its application
have undergone changes.
The adaptation of the doctrine to changing morals was discussed in Keene v.
Kimball. 36 In that case, the defendant, charged with pirating a copyrighted play,
raised obscenity as a defense on the premise that all dramatic compositions were
once considered obscene. The court found the argument "ingenious and interest-
ing," but rejected it, saying that "the particular application once made of this rule
of the common law, in conformity with the peculiar opinions, sentiments or
prejudices of one generation of men, will not control its application in a state of
society where different views prevail. '37
A further illustration is offered by two cases dealing with the same material,
decided thirty-four years apart. In 1867, a play entitled "Black Crook" was
denied copyright protection because it was judged immoral. 38 In 1901, an action
accepted on the basis of early English and American decisions); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co.,
47 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (rule stated and accepted without explanation, but
matter in question found not to be obscene); Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y.
1925) (same).
30. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (1958), 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 329 (1959).
31. Id. at 399, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332.
32. Underlying the opinion was the practical consideration that, while the Register could
validly refuse to issue a copyright when the matter in question was obscene, the burden of doing
so would be too great, in terms of both administrative efficiency and the difficulty of correct
judgment on an issue of constitutional dimensions. Id. at 401-02, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332-33.
33. 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
34. No. 77 Civ. 1062, slip op. at 19 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1977). Following Mitchell Brothers,
the court accepted the defense, relying on the constitutional rationale discussed supra notes 24-25,
but the film in question was found not to be obscene. Id. at 22.
35. F. Lewis, Literature, Obscenity, & Law 4 (1976).
36. 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 545, 77 Am. Dec. 426 (1860), overruled on other grounds, Tompkins
v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 46 (1882).
37. 82 Mass. (16 Gray) at 549, 77 Am. Dec. at 427.
38. Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
1978] 1041
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for copyright infringement was brought against a defendant who had pirated
copies of an advertisement for "Black Crook," and the copyright was enforced. 9
Thus, the application of the rule from Dr. Priestley's Case is dependent on
the morals of the time, and the judicial test for obscenity in copyright cases is
the same test for obscenity used for other purposes. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, many American courts relied on variations of the
test enunciated in an English case, Queen v. Hicklin,40 that material was
obscene if any portion of it would tend to corrupt the minds of those who
were open to immoral influences and who might have access to such materi-
als. 41 Beyond this, no precise guidelines were followed, and the definition of
what might tend to corrupt was left to the discretion of the court. 4 2 In 1933,
the Hicklin test was rejected by federal courts43 in United States v. One Book
Called "Ulysses," 44 and replaced by a test of whether the publication's net
effect was to excite "sexually impure and lustful thoughts" in the person of
average instincts. 45 This standard, adopted by many courts, 46 was much
more liberal, 47 but still left the decision as to what materials excited such
thoughts to the bias of the particular court.
The result was a varying definition of obscenity from state to state and even
from court to court. This disparity was reflected in the copyright cases
involving obscenity, and, as in other contexts, no uniform definition emerged.
Publications judged to be obscene and not a proper subject for copyright were
variously described as "grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the morals
of the people,"'48 "subversive of good morals,"'49 "morally objectionable"
because of "an indelicate and vulgar meaning,"5' 0 "calculated to arouse
39. Hegeman v. Springer, 110 F. 374 (2d Cir. 1901), affd per curiam, 189 U.S. 505 (1903).
40. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
41. Id. at 371. This case interpreted Lord Campbell's Act, a law to protect children from the
abundance of pornography in circulation at the time. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene
Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 51 (1938).
42. For example, Massachusetts courts applied a test of intent to corrupt until 1909, when the
Hicklin rule was adopted, and interpreted both rules so as to repress almost everything. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930) (Dreiser's "An American Tragedy"
found to be obscene). On the other hand, New York courts had a more liberal approach,
tempering the test with a consideration of the work's literary, historical, didactic, or informa-
tional value, thus eliminating the classics, medical texts, and so forth, from the category of
obscenity. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 56-65 (1938).
43. At that time, under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts applied
federal substantive law, rather than the substantive law of the states.
44. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
45. Id. at 184.
46. However, the Hicklin test was not expressly overruled until Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
47. As compared to the Hicklin test, the new test focused on net effect, not isolated passages,
and aimed at protecting the average person rather than the most sensitive. United States v. One
Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934).
48. Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
49. Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875).
50. Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 78-79 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898).
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lust,"'5 1 and having a "libidinous effect."152 Later cases involving copyright
relied on definitions of obscenity found in federal statutes, with no less
diversified results.5 3
This diversity ended in 1957 with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roth v.
United States.54 The Court stated that obscenity was not constitutionally
protected speech, but because former obscenity decisions had often proscribed
speech which was so protected, the Court set forth more specific guidelines as
to what it deemed obscene. Only that which, taken as a whole, was without
redeeming value and appealed to the prurient interest of an average person
applying contemporary community standards could be controlled or prohib-
ited without violating the first amendment.5 5 Although the community
standard was approved for interpreting the guidelines, it was unclear whether
that standard was national or local. In later cases the test was amended
somewhat but there was still no decision as to the meaning of "community. "5 6
The resolution of that issue came in 1973, in Miller v. California. 5 7 There, the
Court amended the guidelines, 8 expressly stated that the community stan-
dard was a local and not a national one, s 9 and required that state laws, either
as written or construed, specifically define what type of depictions are
obscene. 60 The Court, in effect, set narrow limits within which states were
free to proscribe obscenity and approved local variations in interpretation
provided they fell within those limits. 61
The Miller standards, which originated in a case involving state law, were
applied to federal law in United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM.
51. Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
52. Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450, 458 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.
1947).
53. Compare Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947) (applying the
standards of postal and interstate carrier regulations: "The obscenity which the law seeks to
suppress is that which brings the blush of shame to the cheek of virtue, not to the cheek of vice,
not to the wise. . . "), with Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal.
1942) (applying the standards of postal statutes: "[T]he work must be considered as a whole and
have a direct tendency to corrupt morals. Mere vulgarity or coarseness of language does not
condemn it.').
54. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
55. Id. at 487-89.
56. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
57. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
58. Id. at 24-25.
59. Id. at 30-34.
60. Id. at 24.
61. ld. at 23-25. The Court stated that state law may only prohibit or regulate depictions of
sexual conduct and suggested what type of conduct could be defined as obscene. Within these
specific categories, it would be a question of fact as to whether the depiction appealed to the
prurient interest and was patently offensive to the average person applying contemporary
community standards. Id. at 24-25. However, outside these limited categories, material is not
obscene, and a trier of fact would not be free to find that it is. These narrow limits are illustrated
by Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), where a jury found a film to be patently offensive
and to appeal to the prurient interest. Their decision was reversed because the depictions of
sexual conduct in the film did not fall into the categories suggested in Miller. Id. at 161.
1978] 1043
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Film. 62 The Court there considered a case where obscene matter had been
seized by customs officials, as authorized by the Tariff Act.63 Without
discussion of the validity of the application of a local standard to a federal
law, the case was remanded to the district court for consideration of whether
the material was obscene under the Miller standard. 64
The first use of the Miller standard in relation to the federal law of
copyright was in Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater.65
The rule of Dr. Priestley's Case is, under Miller, only applied to that small
class of material which is not protected by the first amendment, rather than to
anything which a particular court may consider immoral. A defense of
obscenity in a copyright suit will be successful only if the material in question
falls within the narrow limits enunciated by the Supreme Court. Within those
limits, the interpretation of the standards need not be uniform, but can vary
with the locale, even when applied to federal law. The problem with applying
local standards to federal law is apparent when the effect of a declaration of a
qopyright's invalidity is examined.
The question remaining is whether a copyright declared invalid on obscen-
ity grounds is invalid only with respect to the parties to the action in which it
was so declared, or only in the jurisdiction in which the case was decided, or
whether it is invalid everywhere. There has been no decision on the effect of
such delaration of invalidity, and the question remains an open one.
The courts which have accepted the obscenity defense have largely ignored
the effect of their decision on parties other than those before the court. 66
There is no doubt that the parties to the suit are bound by res judicata as to
the issues which were raised. 67 The problem would arise if other persons
infringed the copyright and its holder tried to relitigate the question of its
validity. If the prior decision is conclusive as to the issue of the copyright's
validity, relitigation would be impossible, 6 but if it is not conclusive the issue
could be retried with each case of piracy. 69
An analogy can be drawn from cases involving patent infringement. Patent,
like copyright, is an in rem right, 70 good against the world, 71 and the question
of whether a declaration of invalidity bars later relitigation has been more
fully explored in the patent area.
Prior to 1971, a declaration of invalidity of a patent was considered as
62. 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
64. 413 U.S. at 129-30.
65. 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
66. An exception is Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903), where the court said
that "[a]ny person at any place may reproduce [the show] entire if he does not offend the penal
statutes of the jurisdiction in which the performance is given." Id. at 490.
67. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 68, 73 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
68. Id. § 73(a), Comment a, at 191-93.
69. Id.
70. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 678 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
71. P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 17 (1975).
[Vol. 461044
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binding only the parties to the suit. The Supreme Court had established this
rule in Triplett v. Lowell, 7 2 ending disagreement on the issue among the
circuits. The Court held that in a suit for patent infringement, each court
"must determine for itself validity and ownership of the claims asserted,
notwithstanding a prior adjudication of invalidity of some of them, unless
those issues have become res adjudicata, by reason of the fact that both suits
are between the same parties or their privies."7 3 This rule that a prior
judgment of the invalidity of a patent does not bar relitigation of the issue was
held to apply even when the prior adjudication and the later one occurred in
the same circuit.
74
In 1971 the Supreme Court overruled the Triplett principle in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.7 - Stressing
the cost, length, and complexity of patent cases, the overloaded court dockets,
and the possibility that the holder of a patent declared invalid might receive
license fees or royalties from parties who would rather pay them than go to
court to relitigate validity, the Court held that judicial declaration of invalid-
ity of a patent can operate to estop the patentee from relitigating the issue.
7 6
This, the Court felt, satisfied due process requirements, since the patentee had
already had an opportunity to argue the issue of validity fully.77 A narrow
exception was made for cases where, through no fault of the patentee, the
court in the previous case had failed to grasp the technical aspects of the
patent involved. 78 The Court, however, established the general rule that a
declaration of invalidity bars future relitigation of the issue.
7 9
The reasoning used in patent decisions can be applied to copyright cases by
analogy. Both patents and copyrights are "intellectual property,"8' 0 and both
are governed solely by federal laws enacted under the same constitutional
power.8 1 The differences between patent and copyright lie principally in the
72. 297 U.S. 638, 644 (1936).
73. Id. at 645.
74. Id. at 648.
75. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
76. Id. at 334-50.
77. Id. at 329-30.
78. Where a patent is declared invalid, and its subject matter is "so complex that legal minds,
without appropriate grounding in science and technology, may have difficulty in reaching
decision," id. at 331, the court in a second case involving the patent's validity may find that it is
unjust for the prior decision to operate as a bar, id. at 333-34. For a case employing this
exception, see Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193
(W.D. Pa. 1974). This case involved a patent on a complex process for converting molten iron
into steel. The court found that, since the district court in the previous case had failed to
understand "the gist of the invention" and the error was not corrected on appeal, this was one of
the unusual cases in which the prior judgment of invalidity should not be conclusive. Id. at
271-72.
79. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). A decision upholding the validity of a patent, however, never
bars future challenges involving different parties. P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 17
(1975).
80. P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 23 (1975).
81. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
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types of materials they cover, the criteria for obtaining them, and the
protection they afford. 82 For purposes of determining whether a judgment of
invalidity is conclusive, the similarities may be sufficient to convince a court
to apply the reasoning of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories83 to a case involving
the invalidity of a copyright. Should such an application be made, the tension
between the obscenity defense and the local community standard for deter-
mining obscenity would clearly come into focus.
Three elements coalesce in Mitchell Brothers: the rule that obscenity will
not be protected by copyright, the local community standard for determining
obscenity, and the possibility that a prior judgment of invalidity of a
copyright on obscenity grounds may block relitigation of the issue. If the
result is legalized nationwide piracy of the material, it is incongruous, not
only because obscenity would be proliferated rather than suppressed, but also
because copyright benefits would be denied to material which may be
protected speech, not obscenity, in some jurisdictions. Chief Justice Burger's
statement in support of a local community standard, that residents of Maine
or Mississippi cannot be required to accept depictions found tolerable in Las
Vegas or New York,84 would be reversed. At least in the context of copyright
protection, residents of Las Vegas or New York may be governed by what is
tolerated in Maine or Mississippi.
Should the situation arise in which a plaintiff is sued for infringement of a
copyright already declared invalid in another jurisdiction, several solutions
are possible to avoid the unjust result described above. One possibility would
be that a court could follow the principle of Blonder-Tongue,85 that a prior
adjudication of invalidity blocks relitigation of the validity of a patent,
inapplicable to copyrights. A more theoretically sound solution would be to
hold that, even though a prior adjudication of invalidity may generally
operate to bar relitigation of the validity of copyrights, an exception should be
made for copyrights declared invalid on obscenity grounds. This is a legiti-
mate solution, since the question of obscenity in a second locality would not
have been fully argued and resolved, and since copyright suits are not as long,
costly, or complex as patent suits. The use of a prior adjudication as a bar to
litigation of such an issue would offend due process requirements. 86
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. For a more comprehensive comparison of patent and copyright, see 1 W. Robinson, The
Law of Patents § 26, at 40-43 n.1 (1890), and P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals 23-33
(1975).
83. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
84. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
85. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
86. The fifth amendment requires that notice and a hearing be accorded a person before he is
deprived of property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79-130 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
When the question of obscenity in a given jurisdiction has not been determined, it would seem




However, both of these solutions, though they may be workable in the
situation at issue, avoid the broader problem resulting from the application of
local obscenity standards to federal laws. The inconsistencies which appear
when obscenity is an element of a copyright case are not unique. Whenever a
local standard is used as a basis for a finding of fact in a case involving federal
law, the resulting inconsistency in interpretation of federal law is problematic.
The first amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, permits Con-
gress to prohibit obscenity,8 7 but the extent to which federally imposed
restrictions on obscenity are implemented should not be subject to varying
interpretations from one community to another."8 Admittedly, the scope of
the permissible definition of obscenity under Miller, 8 9 as applied to federal
law by 12 Reels of Film, 90 is very narrow, 91 but the possibility for inconsistent
application exists as long as any variation is allowed. To avoid the result that
legislation of Congress can be varied according to the standards of a particu-
lar locale, a national community standard should be utilized for cases involv-
ing federal law. 92 A national community standard is no more difficult to
ascertain than a local standard, since individuals within a community are as
diverse as are different communities. 93 In a recent case, Justice Blackmun
indicated that a national standard might not be precluded by Miller, if
Congress amended federal legislation to require use of such a standard. 94
Thus, the inequitable result made possible by Mitchell Brothers is indica-
tive of the inconsistency which results whenever local standards are used to
interpret federal law. The problem, should it arise, can be solved in the
copyright context, but the broader issue remains unresolved as long as local
obscenity standards are used to interpret federal law.
Bonnie Wilkinson
87. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957); Sunderland, Book Review, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 799, 805-06 (1977).
88. See generally Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenit -Pornography Decisions, 59
A.B.A.J. 1261, 1262 (1973); Sunderland, Book Review, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 799, 806 (1977).
89. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
90. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
91. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
92. Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59 A.B.A.J. 1261, 1262
(1973); Sunderland, Book Review, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 799, 806 (1977).
In the copyright area, such a standard has already been used by one court. In Argos Films v.
Barry Int'l Properties, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1977), the court chose a
quasi-national and international standard, rather than a local community standard, to determine
if the film in question was obscene. "This choice, while inconsistent with Miller, may well be
preferable in copyright infringement actions .... ." Nolan-Haley, Obscenity, Copyright and
Community Standards, 178 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
93. Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59 A.B.A.J. 1261, 1262
(1973); Sunderland, Book Review, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 799, 806 (1977).
94. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 304 n.ll (1977).
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